Flaviopédia Português
Brazil that Grows

Legal certainty: the rule at the start is the rule at the end

those who invest need to trust that what was agreed will be honored

Proposes a set deadline for environmental license reviews, with approval if the agency misses it, stable rules for up to 20 years for large projects and productive autonomy for indigenous and quilombola peoples.

In the program: [p. 49, 50] · Translated by Flaviopédia from the official Portuguese text; the Portuguese quote is authoritative. Read the original in Portuguese

What the program says

No country attracts investment if it changes the rules in the middle of the game, and Brazil has earned a reputation for doing exactly that: the investor comes in under one rule, executes under another and ends up arguing over a third in the courts. An essential part of changing this logic is environmental licensing that is fast, modern and legally certain: large works, power plants, mines and industrial projects sit idle for years waiting for a license, and every month of delay is investment that flees and jobs that do not come. We will ensure clear rules, defined deadlines and technical criteria, with the certainty that speed and environmental responsibility go hand in hand. The deadline has to apply to both sides. When the developer complies with the law and submits everything the rules require, the responsible agency must have a defined deadline to complete its review. If it neither decides nor issues an opinion within that deadline, the license must be granted, because the State’s delay cannot be a punishment for those who did their part. The responsibility for reviewing remains with the government, but inertia ceases to be a way of blocking those who want to invest and create jobs. We will also ensure that the rule agreed at the start is the rule at the end. For large long-maturation projects, we will create rule-stability mechanisms of up to 20 years, so that the contract is not changed after the works are already standing. And when the developer acts in good faith and duly obtains its license, the State must answer for the losses if it backtracks without the developer having caused it, instead of passing the bill on to those who trusted the word they were given. A country that honors what was agreed attracts investment and the jobs that come with it, from logistics to energy, from mining to agribusiness. This same clarity of rules applies to those who live on traditional lands. Indigenous and quilombola peoples will be granted autonomy to decide on productive activities on their lands, with respect for sustainable development and environmental rules, and with indemnification for any restrictions on usufruct and compensation mechanisms, so that those who live on the land can draw their own livelihood from it. [p. 49, 50]

In plain language

  • The text states that the country changes the rules in the middle of investments and that works, power plants, mines and industrial projects sit idle for years waiting for a license. It proposes environmental licensing with clear rules, defined deadlines and technical criteria.
  • When the developer submits everything the rules require, the responsible agency would have a defined deadline to complete its review. If it neither decides nor issues an opinion within that deadline, the license must be granted. The responsibility for reviewing remains with the government.
  • For large long-maturation projects, the program provides for rule-stability mechanisms of up to 20 years, so that the contract does not change after the works are completed.
  • If the State backtracks on a duly obtained license, without the developer having caused it, the text provides for the State to answer for the losses.
  • It provides for giving autonomy to indigenous and quilombola peoples to decide on productive activities on their lands, with respect for environmental rules, indemnification for any restrictions on usufruct and compensation mechanisms.

What is not in the program

  • It does not define the length of the review deadlines or which types of license they would apply to.
  • It does not name the legal instrument (law, proposed constitutional amendment or decree) for granting the license when the agency does not respond, nor for the rule-stability mechanisms.
  • It does not detail which projects would be considered long-maturation or how the up-to-20-year stability mechanisms would work.
  • It does not say how the indemnification and compensation provided for indigenous and quilombola peoples would be calculated or who would pay them.
  • It presents no cost estimate for the State from liability for developers’ losses.